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Rewind,
Rewrite, Replay (War
on Terror, Iraq, Afghanistan, Etc.)
For video
accompanying and illustrating this commentary, go to the permanent-link page: [http://PoliSat.Com/RewindRewriteReplay.htm]
The
critics of Dubya have thundered
that
toppling Saddam was a blunder
and
strategies for
Afghanistan's
war
without
far more troops was a blunder.
Their
hindsight re-writing of hist'ry--
accounting
by one-sided entries--
attempts
to conceal
conclusions
revealed
by
pairing correlative entries.
To
rightly accomplish this task
means
fully re-writing the past
correlatively
pairing
what
hindsight's despairing
in
half-way re-writing the past.
This
trip to the past would then fix
the stage for events to transfix
the world we now know
so "hist'ry" could show
the Anti-Bush World in '06.
If
hind-sighted views Bush had heeded
that
"War in Afghanistan needed
a much
larger force"
we would
have, of course,
quite
diff'rent by Afghans been treated.
The
warlords opposed to al Qaeda's
and
Taliban's methods as haters
would
nevertheless
have
seen us, at best,
like
Russians-- as foreign invaders.
Perceived
as such foreign enforcers,
in
southern Afghanistan borders,
the
warlords would not
have
helped us to spot
bin
Laden in old Tora Bora.
It's
likely they'd help him escape
to
cross-border lands where he'd stay
and
serve as a threat
to help
them eject
the
Yanks if to conquer they stayed.
It's
likely such large Yankee presence
would
hinder our strategy's essence:
Emergence
of leaders
accepted
as leaders
of
Afghans, not "puppets" in essence.
And
warlords who'd helped us eject
the
Taliban's yoke from their necks
would
view our remaining
like
Russians invading,
and us
they would want to eject.
They
then would invite the return
of all
the al Qaedas who'd yearn
to earn
warlords' thanks
by
helping kill Yanks
for
warlords' "to power" return.
With
Yanks being viewed as invaders
of
fiefdoms that Muslims had favored,
Musharraf
would soon
perceive
it as "doom"
to stay
on the side of "invaders."
The
waning allegiance that he
would
show us would later deplete
our
means to detect
the dots
to connect
the
network of A. Q. Khan's deeds.
And then
Bush's critics who'd claimed
invading
would yield us the same
defeat
Russians faced
in
Nineteen-Eight-Eight
would
chant the old "quagmire" refrain.
Such
"quagmire" Saddam would perceive
to
increase his chance for relief
from
"no-flying" zones
through
bellicose tomes
and
shots at our no-fly-zone feats.
From
shots at our no-fly-zone planes,
the
risks germs and gasses remained
concealed
in Iraq,
and
tries to contract
for
yellow-cake, danger remained.
(Though
Wilson in Two-Thousand-Three
from
Niger did claim to receive
the
proof to negate
the
"seeking" of "cake,"
'twas
found that Joe's claim was deceit.*)
(*He'd
twisted his "finding" that "cake"
had not
by Saddam been obtained
from
Niger as though
such
"finding" did show
Saddam
hadn't tried to find "cake.")
Beliefs
that such dangers remained,
the
bellicose acts and Hussein's
continued
rejection
of
weapons inspections
showed
needs for inspections again.
'Twas
clear that Hussein would refuse
to let
such inspections resume
without
massive force
deployed
to enforce
demands
that inspections resume.
So Bush
would be forced to deploy
a force
large enough to destroy
the
Baathist regime
unless
it agreed
that
Blix to Iraq be deployed.
Suppose
Bush had listened to those
in 2003 who proposed
allowing more time
for Hans Blix to find
the weapons or deem them disposed.
By August of Two-Thousand-Three
Hans
Blix would have said: "I can't see
a way to prove claims
that weapons remain,
so 'there' they must no longer be."
Since
sanctions designed to prevent
Saddam
to thenceforth reinvent
his
weapons already
were
weak and unsteady,
de jure
or de facto, they'd end.
And
absent continued employment
of
Yankees in massive deployments
adjacent
Iraq,
Saddam
would retract
consent
for inspectors' deployments.
Saddam
and our "friends" would bemoan
enforcement
of no-flying zones
and
further demand
from
Arabic lands
the
Yankees must promptly go home.
Such
massive "deterrent" deployment
would
hamper offensive deployments
against
Afghan minions
of
warlords' dominions
to end
our "invasion" deployment.
Such
massive deployment maintained
as means
for deterring Hussein
would
increase the fervor
Jihadists
for terror
had
pre-Nine-Eleven** attained.
(**In
Gulf-lands from One-Nine-Nine-One
'til
Nine-One-One-Two-Thousand-One
we'd
down-sized our force
to
token-sized force,
yet
terror returned Nine-One-One.)
The
foregoing factors would be
the
reasons creating a need
to end
the employment
of
massive deployment
by Fall
of Two-Double-Oh-Three.
Such
needed reduction of force
would
mean no inspections, of course.
With
sanctions destroyed,
Saddam
would employ
oil
riches for weapons, of course.
His
riches he promptly would turn
to
recreate gasses and germs
and
quickly resume
his
program to soon***
have
A-Bombs for which he had yearned.
(***Remember,
in One-Nine-Nine-Four,
'twas
learned his Bomb progress was more--
a
half-a-year time
to
working designs--
than
thought before Bush-One's Gulf War.)
Perceiving
Saddam as the winner,
Khadafi
would offer the winner
the help
for a Bomb
from
Pakistan's Khan
in Libya
's secrecy strictures.
Khadafi
would likely explain
to
Arabic, Sunni Hussein
that
Pakistan's Khan
gave
Persian Iran
designs
for its nuclear aims.
Iran
would assume that Hussein
was
working on A-bombs again
and
therefore would strive
to speed
it's design
for
nukes for deterring Hussein.
And
likewise, Hussein would increase
the
tempo to harness the beast
of
nuclear power
on
weapons to cower
Iran as
a threat from the East.
By
Two-Thousand-Six, if not sooner,
Saddam
could give nuclear "boomers"
for
Jihadists' use
on us or
our troops
without
Saddam's "prints" on the "boomers."
Saddam
might have thought he could con
the West
that the source of the bomb
was
Pakistan's Khan,
Il Jung,
or Iran
instead
of a nuke from Saddam.
Saddam
might believe we'd destroy
the
lands where Jihad is employed
by
Shiite Jihadists
or Sunni
Wahhabists--
i.e.,
Saddam's rivals destroyed.
Such
alternate path of reality
is
hidden by hindsight mentalities
of
critics who claim
Iraq
would be tame
if Bush
had possessed their mentality.
And now
that Il Jung has proclaimed
a
"nuclear" bomb is the name
of
Jung's new explosion
we felt
in October,
Oh-Six,
there'd be four in the game:
Il
Jung's North Korea is one;
Khadaffi
would not have undone
his work
on a bomb,
and
faster Iran
would
seek one to counter Saddam's.
Such
full-hindsight rewrite of history
is worse
than the present reality,
where
war in Iraq
brings
danger that's not
as great
as re-written reality.
Bin
Laden remains on the loose
obscuring
a more-vital truth:
A
Russian-style plot
most
Afghans do not
perceive
as the goal we pursue.
And
likewise, our un-Russian goal
helps
Pakistan stay in our fold.
Though
war in Iraq
is
tougher in fact,
to win
will serve liberty's goals.
Although
Kim Il Jung took the route
of
testing a "bomb," and we doubt
the
Persians will cease
enrichment,
at least
Saddam
and Khadaffi are "out."
If
critics "their way" would have had
instead
of "strategery's" path,
posterity's
risks
of
nuclear "hits"
more
likely would be twice as bad.
To whom
are our thanks most deserving?
Our
troops for courageously serving
in
dangerous roles
for
liberty's goals,
so thank
them we must for their serving.
For
musical "thanks" to our troops
in
planes and on ships and in boots
the link
shown below
is where
you may go
to view
and hear "Thanks to Our Troops":
http://PoliSat.Com/Thanks.htm.
--Jim
Wrenn. Editor at PoliSat.Com.
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