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Our Thanks To Our Great Troops as No-Thanks to Nut-Roots.·

   

March 16, 2007--

Gathering of Eagles in D.C. issues Rolling Thunder Answer to "ANSWER" and Code Red response to Code Pink with Red, White & Blue Thanks to Troops in Iraq, Afghanistan and worldwide.·

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Rewind, Rewrite, Replay

(War on Terror, Iraq, Afghanistan, Etc.)

 

The critics of Dubya have thundered 

that toppling Saddam was a blunder

and strategies for

Afghanistan's war

without far more troops was a blunder.

 

Their hindsight re-writing of hist'ry--

accounting by one-sided entries--

attempts to conceal

conclusions revealed

by pairing correlative entries.

 

To rightly accomplish this task

means fully re-writing the past

correlatively pairing

what hindsight's despairing

in half-way re-writing the past.

 

This trip to the past would then fix
the stage for events to transfix
the world we now know
so "hist'ry" could show
the Anti-Bush World in '06.

 

If hind-sighted views Bush had heeded

that "War in Afghanistan needed

a much larger force"

we would have, of course,

quite diff'rent by Afghans been treated.

 

The warlords opposed to al Qaeda's

and Taliban's methods as haters

would nevertheless

have seen us, at best,

like Russians-- as foreign invaders.

 

Perceived as such foreign enforcers,

in southern Afghanistan borders,

the warlords would not

have helped us to spot

bin Laden in old Tora Bora.

 

It's likely they'd help him escape

to cross-border lands where he'd stay

and serve as a threat

to help them eject

the Yanks if to conquer they stayed.

 

It's likely such large Yankee presence

would hinder our strategy's essence:

Emergence of leaders

accepted as leaders

of Afghans, not "puppets" in essence.

 

And warlords who'd helped us eject

the Taliban's yoke from their necks

would view our remaining

like Russians invading,

and us they would want to eject.

 

They then would invite the return

of all the al Qaedas who'd yearn

to earn warlords' thanks

by helping kill Yanks

for warlords' "to power" return.

 

With Yanks being viewed as invaders

of fiefdoms that Muslims had favored,

Musharraf would soon

perceive it as "doom"

to stay on the side of "invaders."

 

The waning allegiance that he 

would show us would later deplete

our means to detect

the dots to connect

the network of A. Q. Khan's deeds.

 

And then Bush's critics who'd claimed

invading would yield us the same

defeat Russians faced

in Nineteen-Eight-Eight

would chant the old "quagmire" refrain.

 

Such "quagmire" Saddam would perceive

to increase his chance for relief

from "no-flying" zones

through bellicose tomes

and shots at our no-fly-zone feats.

 

From shots at our no-fly-zone planes,

the risks germs and gasses remained

concealed in Iraq,

and tries to contract

for yellow-cake, danger remained.

 

(Though Wilson in Two-Thousand-Three

from Niger did claim to receive

the proof to negate

the "seeking" of "cake,"

'twas found that Joe's claim was deceit.*)

 

(*He'd twisted his "finding" that "cake"

had not by Saddam been obtained

from Niger as though

such "finding" did show

Saddam hadn't tried to find "cake.")

 

Beliefs that such dangers remained,

the bellicose acts and Hussein's

continued rejection 

of weapons inspections

showed needs for inspections again.

 

'Twas clear that Hussein would refuse

to let such inspections resume

without massive force

deployed to enforce

demands that inspections resume.

 

So Bush would be forced to deploy

a force large enough to destroy

the Baathist regime

unless it agreed

that Blix to Iraq be deployed.

 

Suppose Bush had listened to those
in 2003 who proposed
allowing more time
for Hans Blix to find
the weapons or deem them disposed.


By August of Two-Thousand-Three

Hans Blix would have said:  "I can't see
a way to prove claims
that weapons remain,
so 'there' they must no longer be."

 

Since sanctions designed to prevent

Saddam to thenceforth reinvent

his weapons already

were weak and unsteady,

de jure or de facto, they'd end.

 

And absent continued employment

of Yankees in massive deployments

adjacent Iraq,

Saddam would retract

consent for inspectors' deployments.

 

Saddam and our "friends" would bemoan

enforcement of no-flying zones

and further demand

from Arabic lands

the Yankees must promptly go home.

 

Such massive "deterrent" deployment

would hamper offensive deployments

against Afghan minions

of warlords' dominions

to end our "invasion" deployment.

 

Such massive deployment maintained

as means for deterring Hussein

would increase the fervor

Jihadists for terror

had pre-Nine-Eleven** attained.

 

(**In Gulf-lands from One-Nine-Nine-One

'til Nine-One-One-Two-Thousand-One

we'd down-sized our force

to token-sized force,

yet terror returned Nine-One-One.)

 

The foregoing factors would be

the reasons creating a need

to end the employment

of massive deployment

by Fall of Two-Double-Oh-Three.

 

Such needed reduction of force

would mean no inspections, of course.

With sanctions destroyed,

Saddam would employ

oil riches for weapons, of course.

 

His riches he promptly would turn

to recreate gasses and germs

and quickly resume

his program to soon*** 

have A-Bombs for which he had yearned.

 

(***Remember, in One-Nine-Nine-Four,

'twas learned his Bomb progress was more--

a half-a-year time

to working designs--

than thought before Bush-One's Gulf War.)

 

Perceiving Saddam as the winner,

Khadafi would offer the winner

the help for a Bomb

from Pakistan's Khan

in Libya 's secrecy strictures.

 

Khadafi would likely explain

to Arabic, Sunni Hussein

that Pakistan's Khan

gave Persian Iran

designs for its nuclear aims.

 

Iran would assume that Hussein

was working on A-bombs again

and therefore would strive

to speed it's design

for nukes for deterring Hussein.

 

And likewise, Hussein would increase

the tempo to harness the beast

of nuclear power

on weapons to cower

Iran as a threat from the East.

 

By Two-Thousand-Six, if not sooner, 

Saddam could give nuclear "boomers"

for Jihadists' use

on us or our troops

without Saddam's "prints" on the "boomers."

 

Saddam might have thought he could con

the West that the source of the bomb

was Pakistan's Khan,

Il Jung, or Iran

instead of a nuke from Saddam.

 

Saddam might believe we'd destroy

the lands where Jihad is employed

by Shiite Jihadists

or Sunni Wahhabists--

i.e., Saddam's rivals destroyed.

  

Such alternate path of reality

is hidden by hindsight mentalities

of critics who claim

Iraq would be tame

if Bush had possessed their mentality.

 

And now that Il Jung has proclaimed

a "nuclear" bomb is the name

of Jung's new explosion

we felt in October,

Oh-Six, there'd be four in the game:

  

Il Jung's North Korea is one;

Khadaffi would not have undone

his work on a bomb,

and faster Iran

would seek one to counter Saddam's.

 

Such full-hindsight rewrite of history

is worse than the present reality,

where war in Iraq

brings danger that's not

as great as re-written reality.

 

Bin Laden remains on the loose

obscuring a more-vital truth:

A Russian-style plot

most Afghans do not

perceive as the goal we pursue.

 

And likewise, our un-Russian goal

helps Pakistan stay in our fold.

Though war in Iraq

is tougher in fact,

to win will serve liberty's goals.

 

Although Kim Il Jung took the route

of testing a "bomb," and we doubt

the Persians will cease

enrichment, at least

Saddam and Khadaffi are "out."

 

If critics "their way" would have had

instead of "strategery's" path,

posterity's risks

of nuclear "hits"

more likely would be twice as bad.

 

To whom are our thanks most deserving?

Our troops for courageously serving

in dangerous roles

for liberty's goals,

so thank them we must for their serving.

 

For musical "thanks" to our troops

in planes and on ships and in boots

the link shown below

is where you may go

to view and hear "Thanks to Our Troops":

 

http://PoliSat.Com/Thanks.htm.

--Jim Wrenn. Editor at PoliSat.Com.

 

 

            Thousands are converging on Washington D.C. despite the expected bad weather.  The out-of-Iraq-now activists such as Code Pink, MoveOn, Cindy Sheehan, Jane Fonda, "ANSWER," and the Left Wing (, no "Fuselage") of the Democratic party will be infringing on the intellectual property-rights of the most virulent opponents of the war against Jihadists-- such as al Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, Hizbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, Ahmadinejad, Assad, Hugo Chavez, etc.   

            Supporters of the troops and their mission in Iraq, Afghanistan and world-wide against Jihadists will be invoking the intellectual property introduced to the world in the form of constitutional government designed to ultimately secure life, liberty and the fruits of human labor and ingenuity (commonly known as "property" rights) and to oppose tyranny and religious fanaticism.  Rolling Thunder, Gathering of Eagles, "milbloggers," Veterans, "Troops Need You," and numerous other groups will be expressing not only their support of the troops and their mission but also will be saying "Thanks" to the troops in as many ways as possible.

            A lengthy quotation from a 2006 article and video helps expose the speciousness of the "out-of-Iraq-now" argument (starting below):

            The critics of Dubya have thundered that toppling Saddam was a blunder and strategies for Afghanistan's war without far more troops was a blunder.  Their hindsight re-writing of hist'ry-- accounting by one-sided entries-- attempts to conceal conclusions revealed by pairing correlative entries.

            To rightly accomplish this task means fully re-writing the past correlatively pairing what hindsight's despairing in half-way re-writing the past.  This trip to the past would then fix the stage for events to transfix the world we now know so "hist'ry" could show the Anti-Bush World in '06.

            If hind-sighted views Bush had heeded that "War in Afghanistan needed a much larger force" we would have, of course, quite diff'rent by Afghans been treated.  The warlords opposed to al Qaeda's and Taliban's methods as haters would nevertheless have seen us, at best, like Russians-- as foreign invaders.

Silent Preview (above)

"play" below for  MiniVideo version

"Rewind, Rewrite, Replay "

For in-page viewing of larger 

versions, click here for permanent

 URL or find it by title in PoliSat.Com's index--here.

 powered by GlobalWeb.Net 

To view the video in a stand-alone 

 media player, use  permanent links:

[Smallest--Dialup speed]

[Medium-size--Medium-speed]

To display this permanent-links box 

for this video on a website or blog

click here for the copy/paste code.

To display on a website or blog

an automatically-updating 

MiniVideo Box to play whatever is

the latest PoliSat.Com Video,

click here for copy/paste codes

for variety of sizes & configurations.

            Perceived as such foreign enforcers, in southern Afghanistan borders, the warlords would not have helped us to spot bin Laden in old Tora Bora.  It's likely they'd help him escape to cross-border lands where he'd stay and serve as a threat to help them eject the Yanks if to conquer they stayed.

            It's likely such large Yankee presence would hinder our strategy's essence:  Emergence of leaders accepted as leaders of Afghans, not "puppets" in essence.  And warlords who'd helped us eject the Taliban's yoke from their necks would view our remaining like Russians invading, and us they would want to eject.

            They then would invite the return of all the al Qaedas who'd yearn to earn warlords' thanks by helping kill Yanks for warlords' "to power" return.  With Yanks being viewed as invaders of fiefdoms that Muslims had favored, Musharraf would soon perceive it as "doom" to stay on the side of "invaders."  

            The waning allegiance that he would show us would later deplete our means to detect the dots to connect the network of A. Q. Khan's deeds.  And then Bush's critics who'd claimed invading would yield us the same defeat Russians faced in Nineteen-Eight-Eight would chant the old "quagmire" refrain.  

            Such "quagmire" Saddam would perceive to increase his chance for relief from "no-flying" zones through bellicose tomes and shots at our no-fly-zone feats.  From shots at our no-fly-zone planes, the risks germs and gasses remained concealed in Iraq, and tries to contract for yellow-cake, danger remained.  

            (Though Wilson in Two-Thousand-Three from Niger did claim to receive the proof to negate the "seeking" of "cake," 'twas found that Joe's claim was deceit.*)   (*He'd twisted his "finding" that "cake" had not by Saddam been obtained from Niger as though such "finding" did show Saddam hadn't tried to find "cake.")  

            Beliefs that such dangers remained, the bellicose acts and Hussein's continued rejection  of weapons inspections showed needs for inspections again.  'Twas clear that Hussein would refuse to let such inspections resume without massive force deployed to enforce demands that inspections resume.  

            So Bush would be forced to deploy a force large enough to destroy the Baathist regime unless it agreed that Blix to Iraq be deployed.  Suppose Bush had listened to those in 2003 who proposed allowing more time for Hans Blix to find the weapons or deem them disposed.  

            By August of Two-Thousand-Three Hans Blix would have said:  "I can't see a way to prove claims that weapons remain,
so 'there' they must no longer be."
   Since sanctions designed to prevent Saddam to thenceforth reinvent his weapons already were weak and unsteady, de jure or de facto, they'd end.  

            And absent continued employment of Yankees in massive deployments adjacent Iraq, Saddam would retract consent for inspectors' deployments.  Saddam and our "friends" would bemoan enforcement of no-flying zones and further demand from Arabic lands the Yankees must promptly go home.  

            Such massive "deterrent" deployment would hamper offensive deployments against Afghan minions of warlords' dominions to end our "invasion" deployment.  Such massive deployment maintained as means for deterring Hussein would increase the fervor Jihadists for terror had pre-Nine-Eleven** attained.  

            (**In Gulf-lands from One-Nine-Nine-One 'til Nine-One-One-Two-Thousand-One we'd down-sized our force to token-sized force, yet terror returned Nine-One-One.)  The foregoing factors would be the reasons creating a need to end the employment of massive deployment by Fall of Two-Double-Oh-Three.  

            Such needed reduction of force would mean no inspections, of course. With sanctions destroyed, Saddam would employ oil riches for weapons, of course. His riches he promptly would turn to recreate gasses and germs and quickly resume his program to soon***  have A-Bombs for which he had yearned.  (***Remember, in One-Nine-Nine-Four, 'twas learned his Bomb progress was more-- a half-a-year time to working designs-- than thought before Bush-One's Gulf War.)  

            Perceiving Saddam as the winner, Khadafi would offer the winner the help for a Bomb from Pakistan's Khan in Libya 's secrecy strictures.  Khadafi would likely explain to Arabic, Sunni Hussein that Pakistan's Khan gave Persian Iran\ designs for its nuclear aims.  

            Iran would assume that Hussein was working on A-bombs again and therefore would strive to speed it's designfor nukes for deterring Hussein.  And likewise, Hussein would increase the tempo to harness the beast of nuclear power on weapons to cower Iran as a threat from the East.  

            By Two-Thousand-Six, if not sooner,  Saddam could give nuclear "boomers" for Jihadists' use on us or our troops

without Saddam's "prints" on the "boomers."  Saddam might have thought he could con the West that the source of the bomb was Pakistan's Khan, Il Jung, or Iran instead of a nuke from Saddam.  

            Saddam might believe we'd destroy the lands where Jihad is employed by Shiite Jihadists or Sunni Wahhabists-- i.e., Saddam's rivals destroyed.  Such alternate path of reality is hidden by hindsight mentalities of critics who claim Iraq would be tame if Bush had possessed their mentality.

            And now that Il Jung has proclaimed a "nuclear" bomb is the name of Jung's new explosion we felt in October, Oh-Six, there'd be four in the game:  Il Jung's North Korea is one; Khadaffi would not have undone his work on a bomb, and faster Iran would seek one to counter Saddam's.  

            Such full-hindsight rewrite of history is worse than the present reality, where war in Iraq brings danger that's not as great as re-written reality.  Bin Laden remains on the loose obscuring a more-vital truth: A Russian-style plot most Afghans do not perceive as the goal we pursue.  

            And likewise, our un-Russian goal helps Pakistan stay in our fold. Though war in Iraq is tougher in fact, to win will serve liberty's goals.  Although Kim Il Jung took the route of testing a "bomb," and we doubt the Persians will cease enrichment, at least Saddam and Khadaffi are "out."  

            If critics "their way" would have had instead of "strategery's" path, posterity's risks of nuclear "hits" more likely would be twice as bad.   To whom are our thanks most deserving? Our troops for courageously serving in dangerous roles for liberty's goals, so thank them we must for their serving.

            For musical "thanks" to our troops in planes and on ships and in boots the link shown below is where you may go to view and hear "Thanks to Our Troops":

            In reading this text you will find it's written in rhythm and rhyme, however to trick your mind, it is "writ" in paragraph form 'stead of lines, but if you prefer reading rhymes divided by stanzas and lines, look-left and you'll find the views I've opined presented in stanzas and lines.

            http://PoliSat.Com/Thanks.htm.

---Jim Wrenn, Editor at PoliSat.Com.

 Note:  The permanent link to this installment is http://PoliSat.Com/GoE.htm.  If you're interested in obtaining a CD or DVD version or license for downloading, go here.

Editor's Note:  If demand-volume is preventing you from viewing the video now (or causing it to load too slowly), please try again later.  We're working to increase bandwidth.-- Jim Wrenn, Editor@PoliSat.Com.

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end.